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I
Pensions in Developed
Nations

Chapter 2
Occupational Pension Provision in the
United Kingdom
Christopher D. Daykin

This chapter examines the variety of occupational pension provision
within the United Kingdom, including the interaction of the pension
system with the social security system. l
In the United Kingdom all employed and self-employed workers earning more than a low threshold income pay contributions to the social
security system to earn entitlement to a basic pension. The amount of the
basic pension depends on the individual's contribution record but not
on the level of earnings. A second tier of provision is available to all
employees through State Earnings Related Pension Plans (SERPs). However, it is possible to contract out of this part of the social security system through membership in a suitable occupational pension plan or by
means of an appropriate personal pension.
Occupational pension plans usually provide additional benefits over
and above those required for contracting out of SERPs. Some plans only
provide such additional benefits, and their members remain contracted
in to SERPs. Employers are free to set up an occupational pension plan
(or not), and, even where the employer has set up a plan, employees can
choose whether or not to join. Employees who do not join a contractedout occupational pension plan, or who do not own a personal pension
designed for the purposes of contracting out, will automatically be covered by SERPs.
All members of occupational pension plans are free to make additional
personal pension provision, as are those who are covered by SERPs, although upper limits are imposed by the tax authorities on contributions
to tax-efficient personal pension contracts.
About 50 percent of employees are members of an occupational pension plan. Some 90 percent of these are contracted out of SERPs. Nearly
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25 percent of employees are contracted out of SERPs by means of an
appropriate personal pension.

Social Security in the United Kingdom
Basic Pension lFirst Tier)

All employed and self-employed workers in the United Kingdom earning
more than a low threshold income - about 18 percent of national average earnings - are required to pay National Insurance Contributions to
gain entitlement to the basic social security pension. 2
The social security system provides a flat rate basic pension (i.e., not
dependent on earnings) from state pension age (currently 65 for males
and 60 for females, although the female pension age will be increased to
65 between the years 2010 and 2020. with the intention of achieving
equal retirement ages for males and females). The maximum amount is
payable only if contributions have been paid (or credited) for 90 percent
of the working lifetime. from age 16 to state pension age. but proportionately reduced pensions are payable to those with incomplete contribution records, provided that contributions have been paid or credited for
25 percent of the working lifetime.
The maximum flat rate pension for a single person in 1994/95 is
equivalent to some US$ 86 a week. A married couple can quality for a
maximum pension of about US$138 a week on the basis ofthe husband's
contribution record. Pensions are revalued in April of each year at least
in line with the movement of the Retail Price Index (the United Kingdom 's' consumer price index) over a specified previous 12-month period.
Social security pensions are not reduced if the pensioner has other earnings or income.
Additional Pension lSecond TIer)

In addition to the flat rate pension, earnings-related pensions are payable from state pension age to those who have contributed as employed
persons. The main benefit is an additional pension that is based on earnings between the lower and the upper earnings limits. revalued to the
level appropriate at the time of retirement. It was planned to build up
over the first 20 years of the scheme to 25 percent of the individual's
average earnings between the limits (i.e.• excluding earnings below the
lower earnings limit). Once the scheme had been in place for more than
20 years. the average was to have been taken over the best 20 (revalued)
years of the individual's career. Additional pension does not accrue in
respect of periods of self-employment.
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The lower earnings limit corresponds fairly closely to the amount of
the basic pension (about 18 percent of national average earnings). The
upper earnings limit is 7Y.! times the lower earnings limit (currently 135
percent of national average earnings). Following changes made in 1988,
the proportion of revalued earnings that will be paid to those who retire
will fall for new awards after 1998, until a long-term figure of20 percent
of average revalued total career earnings is achieved (the best 20 years
provision has also been dropped). Revaluation of relevant career earnings is in line with the general movement of earnings over the period.
The upper and lower earnings limits are revalued in line with the basic
state pension, that is, usually in line with the retail price index.

Contracting Out of the Second Tier
Employers are permitted to contract out (from the additional earningsrelated pension) employees who are members of an adequate defined
benefit occupational pension plan. The plan must undertake to provide
members and their surviving spouses with guaranteed minimum pensions that are broadly equivalent, although not identical, to the earningsrelated additional pension to which they would have been entitled if they
had not been contracted out.
Those who are contracted out are entitled to a rebate in their National
Insurance Contributions in respect of earnings between the lower and
the upper earnings limits. This is set for each five-year period on the basis
of a recommendation from the Government Actuary regarding the cost
to the average occupational plan of funding the accruing liability for
guaranteed minimum pensions. The rebate was set at 4.8 percent of
earnings for the period commencing in April 1993.
The effect of this form of contracting out is to substitute earnings-related benefits provided by occupational pension plans, on a fully funded
basis, for the earnings-related benefits that would otherwise have been
payable through the social security system on a pay-as-you-go basis. Almost half the workforce is contracted out through membership in such
defined benefit occupational pension plans.
In 1987 the possibility of contracting out was extended to those with an
appropriate personal pension. The minimum contribution, which was
initially set as equal to the rebate for contracted-out defined benefit
occupational pension plans, is paid directly into the personal pension
arrangement by the Department of Social Security. There are certain
restrictions on the form in which the benefit may be paid, so that appropriate personal pensions always have to be distinguished from other types
of personal pension contract.
Since the minimum contribution is the same for all, regardless of age
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and sex, but the cost of providing a given level of benefit increases with
age, contracting out by means of an appropriate personal pension is
particularly attractive to younger employed persons. About a quarter of
the employed workforce (nearly 5 million people) is now contracted out
on the basis of appropriate personal pensions.
Contracting out is now also possible for employers with money purchase (defined contribution) plans (CaMPs). The employer'S obligation
extends only to paying the minimum contribution into the plan and no
guarantees have to be given concerning the minimum level of pension.
Additional contributions may be made by the employer and by the employees. About 300,000 employees are now thought to be members of
CaMPs.
An individual who has been contracted out may still receive an earnings-related additional pension from the social security system. The
amounts of any guaranteed minimum pensions payable from occupational pension plans are simply deducted from the total entitlement to
additional pension that would have existed if the individual had not been
contracted out; the balance is payable from social security.
In 1994/95 contributions to social security will fall by about US$ 11
billion, or some 17 percent of gross contribution income, as a result of
contracting out. Gross earnings-related additional pension from the social security system would have been around US$ 6 billion in 1994/95,
but the net amount payable, once account is taken of contracting out, is
at about half this level. The proportionate reduction will increase further
as the scheme matures, so that in 2035/36 the net payments are expected
to be US$ 18 billion (in terms of 1994/95 levels of benefit) as compared
to potential gross expenditure of around US$ 45 billion.
Major changes to the contracting out arrangements were introduced
through a pensions bill in the 1994/95 session of Parliament, which
involve the abolition of the guaranteed minimum pension concept from
April 1997. Instead, contracted out defined benefit plans will have to
satisfY certain overall benefit requirements. Those who are contracted
out will in future be totally contracted out and will not be entitled to any
additional pension from the social security system in respect of that period. The contracted out contribution reduction will reflect the full value
of earnings-related social security benefit forgone.
The minimum contribution for appropriate personal pensions (and
for CaMPs) will be made age-related (although the same for men and
women at any particular age) and designed to cover the cost of replicating the earnings-related social security benefit forgone through an individual pensions contract. Greater flexibility will be introduced in the way
in which appropriate personal pension benefits can be taken, including
flexibility regarding retirement age.
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Private Pension Plans
Private pension plans playa vitally important role in the overall structure
of provision for retirement in the United Kingdom. 3 Until 1987 private
pension plans were mainly sponsored by individual employers, although
a few plans existed on an industry-wide basis. Personal pensions were
considered suitable for the self-employed and for some senior executives with individually tailored pension arrangements. The introduction
in 1987 of appropriate personal pensions as a vehicle for contracting
out of the State Earnings Related Pension led to a rapid growth in personal pension coverage, mainly among the 50 percent or so of employed
workers who were not previously members of any occupational pension
plan.
Concern in the 1970s and 1980s about some of the apparent inequities
of many private sector occupational pension plans, particularly in regard
to the treatment of early leavers and the absence of full indexation of
pension benefits, led to a proliferation of legislative requirements for
pension plans. The effect of these, together with the complexities of
contracting out, has been to dampen enthusiasm, at least among employers, for defined benefit occupational pension plans. Nevertheless,
there is little evidence so far of employers discontinuing defined benefit
plans or of any significant switch to group money purchase plans, although some employers setting up new schemes may be attracted to the
defined contribution route.
Small employers are more likely to operate an insured plan. There
has been a reduction in the number of insurance companies willing to
operate such plans on a defined benefit basis, largely because of the
administrative burden involved. It is thought that a number of smaller
employers have switched from defined benefits to money purchase arrangements.
Money purchase, whether on a group basis or in the form of personal
pensions, has come back into fashion, having been badly discredited in
the 1950s and 1960s because of inadequate payouts. Results for individual pensioners are bound to be variable. Investment performance will
have to be very good to overcome the inherent cost disadvantages of
individual pension policies, as compared to the relatively efficient cost
structure of occupational pension plans and the very low administrative
costs of the social security system.
Money purchase plans may have the effect of stimulating more widespread interest in the value of the pension promise and the importance
of one's accumulated pension rights as a major personal asset. The effect
of the emphasis on personal pensions in recent years has certainly been
to goad occupational pension plans (and employers) into much more
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TABLE I

Members of Pension Plans as Percentage of Number of Employees,
by Sector and by Sex, United Kingdom, 1975-1991
Private Sedar

Public Sectar

Both Sectors

Year

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

All

1975
1979
1983
1987
1991

52
48
52
49
48

17
24
24
22
27

86
88
94
90
85

59
55
59
61
61

63
62

30
35
37
35
37

49
50
52
49
48

64

60
57

Source: GovemmentActuary (l994a) , Tables 2.1 and 2.4, and earlier surveys.
Note: Excludes employees who have some pension rights but are not accruing benefits in
respect of current employment.

TABLE 2

Occupational Pension Plan Coverage, United Kingdom, 1991 (millions)

Sectar
Civil Employment
Private Sector
Public Sector
Public Corporations
Central Government
Local Authorities
Total Public Sector
Total Civilians
Armed Farces,
Central Government
Total

Emplayees

Members

Total

Women

Men

Emplayees

Members

Emplayees

Members

9.3

4.5

7.4

2.0

16.7

6.5

0.5
0.6
1.3
2.4
11.7

0.45
0.6
0.95
2.0
6.5

0.2
1.25
1.65
3.1
10.5

0.15
0.85
0.9
1.9
3.9

0.7
1.85
2.95
5.5
22.2

0.6
1.45
1.85
3.9
10.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

12.0

6.8

22.5

10.7

10.5

3.9

Source: GovernmentActuary (1991), Table 2.4.
Note: Employees are single:counted, Le., those with two jobs are counted once only.

active marketing to employees of the benefits of the pension plan, and
hence to a heightened awareness of what pensions are all about.

Coverage
Table 1 shows the development of membership of occupational pension
plans in the public and private sectors in the United Kingdom since 1975,
based on regular surveys carried out by the Government Actuary. Table 2
shows in more detail the coverage in different types of employment,
while Table 3 shows the coverage by size of membership for private sector
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Self-Administered and Insured Private Sector Pension Plans by Membership
Size, United Kingdom, 1991

Number
ofActive
Members l

I to IF
12 to 99
100 to 999
1,000 to 4,999
5,000 to 9,999
10,000 & over
Totals

SelfAdministered
Plans

18,000
11,820
4,390
610
95
85
-35,000

Members
(thousands)

120
460
1,190
1,200
670
2,160
5,800

Insured
Plans

Total

Members
(thousands)

77,500
14,930
560
9

210
360
90
10

1
-93,000

30
700

Plans

95,500
26,750
4,950
619
95
86
128,000

Members
(thousands)

330
820
1,280
1,210
670
2,190
6,500

Source: Government Actuary (1991). Table 4.2.
Note: 1Plans with no members accruing benefits in respect of current service are excluded from
the table.
2The number of plans with 11 or fewer members is subject to a wide margin of uncertainty
because of the limitations of the sampling method used.

plans. Further data from the Government Actuary's Ninth Survey of
Occupational Pension Schemes are given in Tables 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10.
In the private sector, coverage is generally very high among large organizations and relatively low among small firms. These figures do not,
however, include personal pensions, which can be expected to be more
common among employees of small organizations. Of the 10.7 million
members of occupational pension plans in 1991,9.7 million were contracted out of the SERFs. All of the one million members of schemes not
contracted out were in the private sector, so that 100 percent of public
sector pension plan members and 78 percent of private sector pension
plan members were contracted out.

Framework for Occupational Pension Plans
There is no general legislative framework for occupational pension
plans in the United Kingdom. The main constraint on the form of such
schemes is the need to obtain approval from the Inland Revenue (the
taxation authority) in order to qualify for beneficial taxation treatment.
This tax treatment is not available for plan membership for earnings
above about US$ 115,000 per year.
In order to qualify for tax privileges, a plan must be established under
an irrevocable trust, with the administration and financial management
of the plan in the hands of trustees. The trust fund has to be maintained
quite separately from the assets of the sponsoring employer, and money
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TABLE 4

Members of Pension Plans Paying Contributions of Various Types,
United Kingdom, 1991 (thousands)
Private Sectar

Percentage ofSalary
Defined Benefit Plans
Under 2%
2% and under 3%
3% and under 4%
4% and under 5%
5% and under 6%
6% and under 7%
7% andover
Total Paying Percentages
Non-Contributory
or Other Basis
Total
Money Purchase Plans
Under 2%
2% and under 3%
3% and under 4%
4% and under 5%
5% and under 6%
6% and under 7%
7% and over
Employee's Share
of National Insurance
Contraeted-0ut Rebate
Total Paying Percentages
Non-Contributory
or Other Basis I
Totals
Combined Totals

Contracted
Out

Not
Contracted
Out

Public Sector

AU

Total

20
150
275
730
1,690
1,125
105
4,095

5
25
105
30
85
70
35
355

5
240
2,805
210
3,910

675
175
380
765
2,015
4,000
350
8,360

945
5,040

205
560

290
4,200

1,440
9,800

65
45
40
50
10
20

25
60
65
45
60
10
10

25
125
110
85
110
20
30

170
400

275

170
675

195
470

225
900

30
430

--

5,470

1,030

650

4,200

10,700

Source: Government ACluary (1991), Table 6.5.
Note: 1 Includes members whose contributions are purely voluntary.

can only be lawfully returned to the employer in special circumstances.
This applies to plans in both the private and public sectors, apart from a
few public service plans that are established under their own legislation
and do not require separate Inland Revenue approval (e.g., the civil
service, the armed forces, teachers, and health service workers). With the
exception of the scheme for local authority workers, these statutory public service plans are not funded.
Pension plans are usually established by individual firms or companies
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Number of Active Members of Final Salary Plans by Pension Accrual
Fraction (thousands)
Private Sectar

Pension Accrual Fraction

Contracted
Out

Not
Contracted
Out

Public
Sector

Total

Plans giving benefit on retirement
ofpension only, possibly part commutabk to a lump sum

Better than 60ths
(if service less than 40 years)
60ths
Between 60ths and 80ths
80ths
Less than 80ths
Totals

755
3,405
95
120
5
-4,380

120
245
25
45
25
460

190
170

360

1,065
3,820
120
165
30
5,200

5
130
285
3,405
15
3,840

25
175
305
4,060
15
4,580

Plans giving benefit on retirement
expressed as pension and separate
lump sum

Better than 60ths
(if service less than 40 years)
60ths
Between 60ths and 80ths
80ths
Less than 80ths
Totals

20
45
585

10
70

660

80

10

Source: Government Actuary (1991), Table 7.8.

for their employees (or for certain categories ofemployees). A single pension plan may be established in respect of the employees of a group of related companies. There are also a few industry-wide pension plans established for all the employees in a particular industry. The employer must
contribute to the plan for it to be approved for tax purposes (or must
contribute to another plan of which the employee is also a member).

Trustees
Pension plans operate as trusts under the general provisions of trust
law, which lays the responsibility for good conduct of the trust on the
trustees. There are no legal requirements regarding the composition of
the trustees. In practice about 60 percent of members of private sector
plans are in plans where at least some of the trustees are elected or
nominated as representatives of the members. The employer usually has
the power to appoint the trustees.
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TABLE 6

Percentage Distribution of Investments of Self-Administered Pension
Funds, United Kingdom, as of December 31,1992

United Kingdom Investments
Cash, Deposits and Other Short Term Assets
(Net of Short Term Liabilities and Borrowing)
Government Fixed Interest Securities
Company Fixed Interest Securities (Including Convertibles)
Loans and Mortgages
All Fixed Interest
Government Index-Linked Securities
Ordinary Shares
Unit Trust Units
All Equity Shares
Land, Property and Ground Rents
Property Unit Trust Units
All Real Estate
Other Investments
Total United Kingdom Investments
Investments Outside the United Kingdom
Cash, Deposits and Other Short-Term Assets
Government Securities
Ordinary Shares
Other
Total Investments Outside the United Kingdom
Total Investments

3.3
3.8
1.6
0.1
8.7
2.8
52.9
2.2
55.2
5.2
0.5
5.7
7.5
79.9

0.3
2.8
16.5
0.5
20.1
100.0

Source: Government Actuary (1994b).

TABLE 7

Average Percentage Distribution ofIncome of Pensioner Units
by Source, United Kingdom, 1980-88
Source 0/ Income

1980

1984

1988

State Pension
Occupational Pension
Savings Income
Earnings
Total Gross Income
Total Net Income

61
16
11
11
100
93

61
18
13
8
100
92

51
23
17
8
100
90

Source: Family Expenditure Survey (1980, 1984, 1988).

With one exception, there are no formal requirements for consultation with members or employers. The exception is the obligation to consult relevant trade unions on the decision whether to contract out of the
social security second tier. In practice pension plan issues will often form
part of negotiations between the employer and employee associations
(or trade unions) on remuneration and conditions ofservice. Changes to
the pension plan rules, including benefit improvements, are normally a
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Number of Pensions in Payment from Defined Benefit Plans
According to Increases Promised by Plan Rules, United Kingdom,
1991 (thousands)

Amount ofPromised Increase

Fixed Increase of:
5.00% or greater
4.00 to 4.99%
3.00 to 3.99%
Less than 3.00%
Percentage ofRPI
Full RPI Linking
Index-Lin king with RP1
to a maximum of 5%
Other
None
Totals

Private
Sectar

Public
Sectar

100
70
440
90
30
460

Total

100
70
440
90
30
3,290

2,830

1,220
390
600
3,400

100
270

1,320
660
600
6,600

3,200

Source: Government Actuary (1991), Table 9.5.
Note: RPI is the official Retail Price Index (Consumer Price Index).
TABLE 9

Numbers of Plans and of Members in Plans in the Private Sector by Type of Plan,
United Kingdom, 1991

Private Sectar
(by Number of
Members in Plan)

Contracted Out

Not Contracted Out

Total
Plans

Members
(thousands)

45
100
165
100
10
140
560

19,800
12,500
4,230
580
91
- - 84
37,285

85
450
1,135
1,145
635
2,150
5,600

65,700
7,200
270
7
1
1
73,179

185
195
55
15
5
15
470

76,000
14,000
670
37
6
2
90,715

235
380
145
65
35
40
900

87,604

1,030

128,000

6,500

Plans

Members
(thousands)

Plans

1-11'
12-99
100-999
1,000-4,999
5,000-9,999
10,000+
Totals'

9,600
8,900
3,660
530
90
80
22,860

40
350
970
1,045
625
2,010
5,040

10,200
3,600
570
50
1
4
--14,425

Defined Contribution
1-11'
12-99
100-999
1,000-4,999
5,000-9,999
10,000+
Totals'

10,300
6,800
400
30
5
1
-17,536

50
185
90
50
30
25
430

Totals, Both Types'

40,396

5,470

Members
(thousands)

Defined Benefit

Source: Government Actuary (1991), Table 5.2.
Note: IThe number of plans with 11 or fewer members is subject to a wide margin of uncertainty because

of the limitations of the sampling method.
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TABLE

10 Self-Administered Private Sector Pension Plans by Market Value
ofAssets, 1991
Market Value
ofAssets
(US$miUioo)

Under 1.5
1.5-10
15-75
75-150
150-375
375-750
750-1,500
1,500+
Totals

Plnns

24,300
8,000
2,080
260
185
90
50
35
35,000

Members
(thousands)

340
830
1,020
390
610
660
590

1,360
5,800

Total Value
ofAssets
(USS billion)

12
35
73
27
45
45
51
162
450

Source: Government Actuary (1991), Table 4.3.

matter for the employer. Even if the trustees do not have the power to
change the rules, their consent is usually required. These provisions are
set down in the trust deed that establishes the plan. Unless the deed
contains a power of alteration, the law does not permit changes except
where approved by the Occupational Pensions Board.
Once trustees have been appointed, they are not expected to behave as
representatives of any particular sectional interest. It is their responsibility to administer the trust deed in accordance with the rules of the
plan. The responsibilities of trustees are laid down in general trust law,
which is of ancient origin and does not provide specifically for pension
aspects. The trustees have a personal and fiduciary responsibility to invest the scheme moneys in a prudent way, in compliance with the trust
deed and rules. The trustees can delegate the tasks ofadministration and
investment to employed staff or to external experts, but they retain ultimate responsibility for the sound management of the affairs of the pension plan.

Contributions
As mentioned above, the employer must contribute to the plan. The plan
may indeed be financed entirely by contributions from the employer.
However, it is common for the rules to specify an employee contribution
rate, usually defined as a percentage of salary. Table 4 summarizes the
distribution of different employee contribution percentages for both
public and private sector plans.
The employer's rate of contribution is occasionally specified in the
rules of the plan, with appropriate provision for dealing with emerging
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surpluses or deficits. However, the most common arrangement is for the
employer to meet the balance of cost. The employer contribution rate
from time to time is then agreed upon in the light of regular actuarial
valuations, taking into account the adequacy of the assets already held by
the fund in relation to the value of accrued rights, the expected cost of
providing the benefits that will be accruing in the future, and the estimated value of future contributions by employees.

Benefit Design
By far the majority of members of occupational pension plans in the
United Kingdom belong to defined benefit schemes. Most of these provide benefits based on salary at or near to retirement. The commonest
arrangement is for pension to build up as a fraction of final salary, with a
pension of'l6oth payable per year of service. However, other fractions are
also sometimes used (see Table 5). Final pensionable salary is defined in
the rules of the plan and may be the earnings in the last year before
retirement or an average over several years. Where an average is used, the
earlier years may be revalued to the level at retirement using an index,
usually the Retail Price Index.
In order to qualify for tax approval it is also necessary to comply with
certain rules regarding maximum benefits. The maximum permissible
pension at normal retirement age is two-thirds of final salary, subject to a
limit on pensionable earnings for persons who have changed jobs or
entered new pension arrangements since 1989. Although this maximum
pension would usually only be attained by those with 40 or more years of
service, some plans offer accelerated accrual of benefits for late entrants.
The maximum two-thirds pension may be paid provided that there has
been at least 20 years' service.
Part of the pension can be commuted (convened) into a lump sum on
retirement, subject to limits laid down by the tax authorities. This lump
sum is payable free of all taxes, whereas pensions are taxable as earned
income.
Many public sector plans provide a pension of 'l8oth of final pensionable salary for each year of service, together with a lump sum equivalent
to three years of pension. These are shown in the second half ofTable 5 as
a pension of 'l8oth of final pensionable salary for each year of service.
With pension increases in line with the Retail Price Index, as is the case in
the public sector, and corresponding survivors' benefits, a Y60th pension
is more valuable than a 'l8oth pension and %oth lump sum. The table
shows how many members of final salary plans, in the public and private
sectors, have various different pension fractions.
Normal retirement age is defined for each plan within the plan rules.
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Until recently it was common for plans to follow the state pension ages,
although some adopted a different approach, such as age 60 for both
males and females, or age 65 for both. The European Court ofJustice on
May 17, 1990, in the case of Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange, stipulated
that it was unlawful, on the basis of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, to
have inequalities in pension plans between men and women. In the light
of this, most plans have now equalized the pension age for men and
women, at least for service from the date of the judgment, in spite of the
fact that state pension ages in the United Kingdom will not be fully
equalized until 2020.
Most defined benefit pension plans also provide pension benefits on
ill-health retirement and lump sum benefits on death in service, as well as
pensions to surviving widows, widowers, and children. III-health retirement benefits are usually based on final pensionable salary, but they
often take into account a longer period of service than that actually
worked, for example by adding a fixed number of years or by, say, doubling the actual period of service. Many plans now provide a pension on iIIhealth retirement based on the total potential service that could have
been completed up to normal retirement age. Part of the iII-health pension may be taken in lump sum form, as for retirement pension. Ill-health
awards are usually subject to a fairly strict definition of inability to continue working because of ill health or incapacity. Most plans can provide
early retirement pensions without enhancement where ill-health retirement criteria are met.
Widows' and widowers' benefits are also normally related to final pensionable salary, defined as at the date of death of the member, or at the
date of retirement if death occurs after the normal pension has come
into. payment. Widows' and widowers' pensions are usually at the level of
one-half (or occasionally two-thirds) the equivalent member's pension.
When the spouse's benefit arises from death in service, it is common for
the full potential service to normal retirement age to be taken into account. Many plans increase the payment to the widow or widower if there
are dependent children and pay orphans' pensions if there is no surviving spouse. A lump sum benefit is also usually payable on death in service,
regardless of family status and whether or not there are surviving family
members. This can be up to four years' salary, but two years' salary is the
commonest formula.
Vesting and Early Leavers

Anyone who leaves employment (or the pension plan) before normal
retirement age, with two or more years' pensionable service, must be
granted entitlement to the accrued benefit, although th~ benefit is not
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usually payable until retirement age (or prior death). The accrued benefit is defined according to the usual pension formula, treating the date of
leaving as the date of retirement. Accrued rights deferred to normal
retirement age in this way are required by law to be revalued at 5 percent
a year, or in line with the Retail Price Index if this increases at less than 5
percent a year over the period of deferment. A different formula applies
to accrued rights to guaranteed minimum pension under the contracting-<>ut arrangements. In this case revaluation is in line with an earnings
index, but pension plans can limit their liability to a fixed rate of increase, which is currently set at 7 percent a year. Early leavers with less
than two years' service can be given a simple refund of their own contributions. As an alternative to retaining accrued rights in the pension plan
that they are leaving, those with more than two years' service may have
the cash equivalent of their accrued rights (i.e., a transfer value) paid to
another occupational pension plan or into a personal pension arrangement. Where a transfer value is paid to another occupational plan, it will
be used to provide credited years of pensionable service to be added to
the years of actual future membership in the new plan, or credits on a
money purchase (defined contribution) basis.
The rules of the occupational plan usually provide for the amount of
any transfer value payment to be determined by the plan actuary, and
similarly any credit given to a member in respect of an incoming transfer value. In calculating the transfer value payment, or the credit to be
awarded in the receiving plan, the actuary is required to comply with
the mandatory guidance note "GNll: Retirement Benefit SchemesTransfer Values" issued by the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of
Actuaries.
GNll requires the transfer value to be a fair representation of the
actuarial value of the benefits otherwise available on withdrawal, having
regard to market rates of interest. Consistent methods and assumptions
must be used for outgoing and incoming transfers (to discourage bias in
the assumptions). The actuary is required to advise the trustees of a
reduced transfer value if the assets of the plan are not sufficient to cover
the accrued liabilities.

Increases of Pensions in Payment
The pension (and other) benefits are defined in the rules of the plan.
The rules often provide for pensions in payment to be increased by a
fixed percentage each year (say 3 percent or 5 percent), but with discretion to the trustees to award additional increments as the finances of the
pension fund permit, with a view to maintaining more nearly the real
value of the pension at the time of award. Most public sector pension
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plans currently provide automatic or near-automatic indexation of pensions in line with movements in the Retail Price Index.

Member Protection
The main protection for pension plan members is provided by the trust
fund and the role of the trustees. In principle the assets of the trust fund
should be maintained at a level sufficient to ensure that accrued liabilities - that is, liabilities in respect of past service (and salary to date, although allowing for any provisions in the rules or in the law for increases
of benefits in deferment or in payment) - can be met.
If the assets should at any time be shown by an actuarial valuation to be
insufficient to meet the accrued liabilities, it is the responsibility of the
trustees to seek to rectifY the situation, usually by means of additional
contributions from the employer over a future period. Employee contributions may also be increased in some cases. If the employer is unable or
unwilling to increase contributions, it may be necessary for the trustees
to wind up the scheme (or apply to the Court for directions) and secure
benefits for past service.
In the event of insolvency of the employer, or a decision by the employer to cease contributing to the plan, it is the responsibility of the
trustees to ensure that the assets of the trust fund are applied to meet the
accrued liabilities, insofar as is possible, in accordance with the rules of
. the plan. The assets of the plan cannot be called upon by the liquidator of
the employer's business. The trustees will usually seek to purchase annuities and deferred annuities for individual members from an insurance
company to correspond to the accrued liabilities under the plan.
If there is a deficiency in the assets of the plan when they are applied to
meet the discontinuance liabilities, as described in the previous paragraph, the balance is treated as a debt on the employer. In the case of
insolvency of the employer, this debt will rank with other creditors in the
liquidation (it does not have any priority as a debt, although creditors
automatically rank above the interests ofequity shareholders). If the debt
is not paid, the trustees must reduce the benefits payable. This will be
done in accordance with the priorities laid down in the trust deed and
rules.
There is no requirement for insurance of pension plan liabilities
against the risk of employer insolvency, since the separation of the assets
in the trust fund is deemed to provide adequate protection. Protection
against the risk that the trust fund might be inadequate to meet the
accrued liabilities is provided by the role of the actuary and the disclosure to members of the current funding level.
Limited protection is offered in re~pect of the guaranteed minimum
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pensions (GMPs) for contracted-out defined benefit plans. In the event
of discontinuance, such plans can buy back the liabilities for GMPs into
the State Earnings Related Pension scheme. The GMP rights will be restored in full in the social security system, even if the assets available are
inadequate to meet the stipulated buy-back terms. Over the 16 years since
this system was introduced, around 750 pension plans have had recourse
to the "deemed buy-back" arrangements as a result of winding up with
inadequate funds to fulfill promises to members. For all these plans the
total buy-back premiums received amount to some US$ 4.5 million, and
approximately US$ 150 million was treated as having been paid. Some
US$ 145 million of this related to Maxwell companies in 1992/93 and
1993/94. The total amount represents some 0.05 percent of the current
assets of funded pension plans.
Insurance companies are subject to an intensive regulatory regime,
which covers both financial strength and the marketing of products. In
the light of this, insurance company insolvency is regarded as a fairly remote contingency. However, insured pension plans can be inadequately
funded relative to the benefits promised, for example because contributions have not been set high enough, or because money has not been
passed over to the insurer.
Self-administered plans are not subject to any formal solvency requirement or supervision. However, the investments must be managed by an
investment manager with an appropriate authorization under the Financial Services Act 1986, and will as a result be subject to supervision by one
of the regulatory bodies, for example the Investment Managers Regulatory Organization (IMRO).
A surplus can only be removed from a continuing plan with the approval of the Inland Revenue and, in the case of some plans, the Occupational Pensions Board, and will be subject to a 40 percent self-standing tax
charge on any repayment to the employer. Surpluses can, however, be
used to relieve future contributions that the employer might otherwise
have expected to pay.
Although the regulatory regime is not comprehensive, there appear to
have been relatively few problems and the controls provided by the trust
fund structure have been quite robust. However, in the well-known Maxwell case it appears that, without the knowledge of most of the trustees,
and in defiance of trust law, a determined employer may have diverted
the pension plan assets to purposes unconnected with the pension plan,
through a complex web of transactions between connected companies.
This appears to have been facilitated because Maxwell also controlled the
principal investment manager. As a result, a serious position of underfunding has arisen in some of the plans, although guaranteed minimum
pensions in contracted-out plans are protected by the SERPs deemed
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buy-back arrangements. Some of the lost moneys have been recovered,
some voluntary contributions have been made by London firms, and in
some plans the deficiency may be rectified in due course by the continuing employer.
In the wake of these problems, the government established the Pension Law Review Committee (1993), under the chairmanship of Professor Roy Goode, to report on the security of pension scheme rights and
to recommend any changes to the law that might be desirable to improve
such security.
In Septem ber 1993 the Report of the Pension Law Review Committee
was presented to the Secretary of State for Social Security. The report
contained 218 recommendations, covering a broad range of aspects of
occupational pension provision in the United Kingdom, having particular regard to the importance of strengthening the security of the rights of
members of pension plans. The Report recommended the creation of a
post of Pensions Regulator with adequate staffing to supervise the operation of occupational pension plans and with powers to intervene in their
affairs in order to safeguard the interests of members. It was further proposed that the trustees of each plan should have an "appointed scheme
actuary" with responsibility for monitoring the financial affairs of the
plan, for reporting annually on the solvency status of the plan, and for
advising the trustees on the level of funding necessary to ensure a satisfactory continuing financial condition.
Pension plans would be required to meet a minimum solvency requirement based on 100 percent of the present value of benefits promised
active members and former vested members, together with 100 percent
of the cost of purchasing annuities to buyout retirees receiving benefits
(and contingent pensions payable to the dependents of such pensioners). Cash equivalents are already used in the context of transfers between pension plans and represent the present value of the vested accrued rights to which an early leaver would be entitled.
Pension plans falling below the minimum solvency standard of 100
percent of cash equivalents would be required to present a proposal to
demonstrate how the solvency position was to be restored. Should solvency fall below a "base level" of 90 percent of cash equivalents, the
Pensions Regulator would require an immediate injection of cash into
the plan or, failing that, consider whether to wind up the plan and invoke
the "debt on the employer" provisions.
The Committee recommended that a compensation arrangement
should be established to handle the problem of shortfalls in pension plan
assets, restricted, however, to shortfalls arising from fraud, theft, and
misappropriation. The compensation arrangement would be funded by
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means of a post-event levy on all occupational pension plans that might
be covered by the compensation arrangements.
No fundamental change was proposed in the basic legal structure of
pension funds, relying as it does on the precepts of trust law. However,
the Committee did propose that there be a consolidated Pensions Act
and that the Pensions Regulator should be responsible for administering it.
Some tightening up was proposed in the requirements relating to
trustees. For earnings-related plans the active members should be entitled to appoint from among their number at least one-third of the
trustees, whereas at present it is left entirely to individual pension plans
(and more particularly to the employer) to determine the composition
of the trustees. Pensioner trustees should also be encouraged, since the
interests of active members, pensioners, and deferred pensioners may
often be different and sometimes in conflict. The Pensions Regulator
would have the power to disqualify individuals from acting as pension
plan trustees.
Employers should retain the right to wind up a pension plan, with or
without the consent of members, or to change the benefits of the plan in
respect of future service accruals. In the event of a plan winding up,
active members should be entitled to 100 percent ofthe cash equivalents
of their early leaver rights. Any shortfall in scheme assets relative to this
standard should be made good by the employer. The amount of any such
shortfall should be a debt on the assets of the employer, ranking with
other creditors in the event of the employer's bankruptcy.
Trustees should be required to satisty a "prudent man" investment
standard. Detailed investment decisions should continue to be made only
by individuals authorized under the Financial Services Act 1986 in their
conduct of investment business. Self-investment should not exceed 5 percent ofthe assets of the scheme, as is currently the case for contracted-out
plans, and any self-investment above this level should be disregarded in
determining compliance with the minimum solvency requirement. Pension plans should not, however, be required to place the assets with
an independent custodian. The provision of information for members
should be improved, both in content and in clarity and presentation.
Other recommendations related to the importance of taking the value
of pension rights into account on divorce, the simplification of Inland
Revenue requirements for tax approval of pension funds, the simplification of the contracting-out regime, the use of plan surpluses, and the
structure offuture pension plan regulation.
These recommendations were accepted by the government almost in
their entirety, in a June 1994 White Paper. Follow-on bills introduced
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in the 1994/95 session of Parliament will implement the proposals, including a minimum solvency standard based on cash equivalents, a compensation fund limited to cases of fraud, theft, and misappropriation
of assets, a compulsory requirement for one-third of trustees to be appointed by members and pensioners, whistle-blowing roles for actuaries
and auditors, and a Pensions Regulator with fairly wide-ranging powers.
The issue of pension rights in divorce settlements is not, however, to be
resolved at this stage.
The minimum solvency requirement will apply to all defined benefit
plans, apart from those that are not approved for tax purposes because
they offer benefits above Inland Revenue limits and those that are backed
by a guarantee that offers protection at least as good as that provided by
the minimum solvency requirement (for example, unfunded public service plans).
The cash equivalent concept, which is to form the basis for the minimum solvency requirement, is the same as that already used for transferability of pension rights (and for defining any debt on the employer
when a scheme is wound up). It represents the present value of the vested
accrued early leaver rights or the present value of the pension in payment
or deferred pension rights already granted. For the purposes of the solvency test it may be extended to equivalent notional early leaver rights in
respect of those with less than two years' service whose benefits have not
yet vested.
Cash equivalents will be required to comply with minimum requirements laid down in mandatory professional guidance by the Institute of
Actuaries and the Faculty ofActuaries. Discussions are continuing on this
but the intention is that pensions in payment should be valued assuming
matched investment in government bonds or index-linked bonds. However, deferred pension rights in respect of early leavers or active members
wiil be assumed, at the younger ages, to be invested in equities, with some
blending at ages in between.
The solvency position will be reported every three years in the actuarial
valuation, but actuaries may be required to disclose material changes to
the solvency position on an annual basis. The Pensions Regulator will be
responsible for ensuring that action is taken by the trustees of plans that
do not meet 100 percent of the minimum solvency requirement. Plans
reporting under 90 percent solvency will be expected to take immediate
action by means of a cash injection of some other measure of equivalent
value. This might be by means of a guarantee from a recognized bank, or
possibly by providing some form of cash reserve, if the trustees are satisfied that the reserve is adequately ring-fenced in the event of employer
insolvency.
.
The new legislation will override existing priority rules in pension plan
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trust deeds so that, in the event of the plan winding up, each member will
in principle be entitled to the value of the cash equivalent of his or her
accrued rights.
Pension rights accruing after April 1997, whether in respect ofdefined
benefit plans or contracted-out money purchase plans (including appropriate personal pensions), will be required to be revalued in line with
price movements up to 5 percent a year (with the limit applied on an
annual basis) once they come into payment. Deferred pension rights in
respect of early leavers from defined benefit plans will be revalued in line
with prices, with an overall cap of 5 percent a year throughout the full
period of deferment. This corresponds to the existing arrangements for
deferred pension rights in excess of any guaranteed minimum pension.

Disclosure to Plan Members
Trustees are required to make regular disclosure to plan members of
certain prescribed documented information. It is sufficient for some to
be made available on request, for example the trust deed and rules, but
members must receive written notification that the annual report and
accounts are available. A large volume of basic information about the
plan must be supplied to members. This obligation can be met by issuing
a plan booklet, together with an update in the annual report. The information includes the following: tax approval and contracted-out status;
eligibility and conditions for membership; how contributions are calculated; whether contributions have been paid in accordance with the rules
and the recommendations of the actuary; benefit information; rights of
early leavers; treatment of discretionary benefits; awards of pension increases; names of trustees; names of actuary, auditors, solicitors, banks,
investment managers, and other advisers; investment policy; investment
performance review; extent of any employer-related investments; review
of financial development of the scheme.
A statement by the actuary must be included in the annual report,
referring to the latest valuation and the recommended rates of contribution. A full copy of the actuary's valuation report must be made available
to any member on request.

Actuarial (antral
A full actuarial valuation must be carried out at least every three and a
half years (to be reduced to three years from 1997). The actuary must
comment on the funding position in relation to accrued rights had the
plan been wound up on the valuation date, and must also advise on the
contributions necessary in the future to support the benefits.
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There are several alternative approaches to funding, but the most common in current usage is the projected unit method. Under this method a
standard contribution rate is assessed to cover, over the period to the
next valuation (or some other control period), the cost of the additional
pension rights that may be expected to accrue. The existing assets are
then compared with the liabilities in respect of pension rights already
accrued up to the valuation date, allowing for expected increases in
salaries up to retirement age. Any surplus (or deficit) is dealt with by
reducing (or increasing) the standard contribution rate, usually for a
fixed period of years. Other funding methods in use include the attained
age method, the entry age method and the aggregate funding method.
In the past, there have been no specific funding requirements laid
down in regulations, other than an obligation that contracted-out plans
demonstrate that they have the resources to meet guaranteed minimum
pensions. This is changing with new pension legislation implementing
the recommendations of the Pension Law Review Committee.
At present the actuary is required by mandatory professional guidance
on actuarial valuations ("GN9: Retirement Benefit Schemes-Actuarial
Reports") to report on the "current funding level," which represents the
ratio of assets to the value of accrued rights. However, although this is
disclosed in the actuarial valuation report, which is made available to
members on request, at the moment plans are not obligated to remedy a
current funding level of less than 100 percent. This will also change
under the new legislative requirements.

Defined Contribution Plans
In recent years some employers have become concerned about the apparently open-ended cost of defined benefit plans and alarmed about the
increasing complexity of regulations affecting the running of such plans.
An alternative arrangement, which has the merit of simplicity, as well as
effectively limiting the employer's liability, is to establish a defined contribution plan. Some employees also appreciate this approach, since it enables them to see more clearly how their "investment" - their own share
of the fund - is growing.
The contributions of employees and employer can be invested with an
insurance company, either in individual policies or in a managed fund, or
can be invested in an autonomous pension fund under the control of the
trustees, with suitable investment managers. The interests of individual
members will be represented by the value ofthe insurance policies under
the individual approach, orin other cases by the value of units in the fund
that have been attributed to them. The main risk, from the point of view
of employees, is that the resulting benefit will not bear any reasonable
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relationship to their final salary level at retirement, particularly after a
period of high inflation. This problem can be to some extent alleviated by
targeted defined contribution plans, where the contributions can be
adjusted in order to target the benefit on a particular level relative to final
salary.

Personal Pensions
Employees cannot be forced to join a pension plan operated by their
employer. Self-employed persons or employees who are not members ofa
pension plan can set up their own personal pension arrangement with an
authorized pension provider, such as an insurance company, a building
society, or a bank. On reaching retirement age, the proceeds of the
pension investment must be used to purchase an annuity from an insurance company, although one-quarter may usually be taken in lump sum
form. Dependents' benefits can also be purchased. There are limits on
the amount of earnings that can be invested in a personal pension, ranging from 17'h percent of earnings at most ages to more than double that
level at ages close to normal retirement.
As mentioned earlier, personal pensions can now also be used as a
vehicle for contracting out of the state earnings-related additional pension. The contracted-{)ut contribution rebate (referred to in this context
as the minimum contribution) is paid by the Department of Social Security directly to the personal pension provider chosen by the individual.
The amount is a flat percentage of earnings in the relevant band, regardless of the age or sex of the individual. This is attractive only to younger
employees, in particular those who are likely to change jobs frequently.
As individuals get older they will be best advised to contract back in to the
state additional pension, although they may continue to make contributions to a top-up personal pension.
Appropriate personal pensions for contracting-{)ut purposes (i.e., purchased with minimum contributions) must be taken in pension form,
with 3 percent a year pension increases, and a benefit to a surviving
spouse of half the member's pension, but additional contributions can
be applied for other chosen benefits.

Supervision and RegUlation
Pension plans in the United Kingdom are subject to a great deal of
regulation. including requiremen ts of the Inland Reven ue, rules for contracting out, and provisions for the protection of members. Requirements are laid down regarding authorized investment managers, actuarial valuations, and the disclosure of information to members, but the
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enforcement of these and other provisions relies upon the integrity of
trustees and the legal rights of members in the Courts (or before the
Ombudsman). There is no general system of supervision of pension
plans and no single pensions regulator.
Plans that are contracted out of the state earnings-related additional
pension are monitored by the Occupational Pensions Board, an independent statutory body, to ensure that they have, and are likely to continue
to have, adequate resources to meet accrued liabilities in respect of guaranteed minimum pensions. The actuary has to provide a regular certificate to this effect and the supervision relies heavily on this certification
process. However, no specific funding standards have been laid down up
to now.

Tax Advantages
Tax privileges are given to occupational pension plans to encourage employers to set them up and to maintain them. The four main benefits for a
tax-approved occupational pension plan are (1) that employers' contributions are an allowable expense against profits; (2) that employees'
contributions are tax-deductible (i.e., tax is assessed only on the net
income after the deduction of pension plan contributions); (3) that
employers' contributions to the plan are not treated as taxable remuneration in the hands of the employee; and (4) that no tax is payable on
investment income or capital gains within the pension fund.
In order to qualify for tax approval, the plan must be established under
an irrevocable trust and the employer must contribute. Employee contributions must be limited to a maximum of 15 percent of earnings and the
plan must comply with certain maximum benefit requirements. These
include a maximum pension (after 20 or more years service) of lWOthirds final remuneration (defined in one of several approved ways) and
a variety of constraints on other benefits, including invalidity pensions,
survivors' pensions, and lump sums.
A lump sum of up to four years' salary may be paid on death in service.
This is free of tax provided it does not pass automatically to the member's
estate. In practice the trustees generally have complete discretion concerning the choice of recipient. A lump sum of up to one and one-half
years' salary may be paid to the member on retirement, subject to 20 or
more years service and a corresponding reduction in the members' pension benefit. This is also free of lax. All other benefits are taxable as
earned income in the hands of the recipient.
The tax privileges o~ belonging lo a tax-approved occupational pension plan are not available in respect of earnings in excess of about four
and a half times national average earnings, except for those individuals
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who remain in the pension scheme of which they were a member prior to
June 1989.
The tax authorities have defined a maximum funding level that qualifies for tax-free treatment of the investments of the fund. The total
amount of assets that may be held tax-free is 105 percent of the value of
the accrued liabilities on the projected unit method of funding, with
prescribed principal assumptions. For the purposes of this comparison
the assets are valued on a discounted cash flow basis using prescribed
assumptions. If the fund is above the prescribed level at an actuarial
valuation, action must be taken, by increasing benefits or reducing contributions, to enable the fund to comply. Otherwise tax is levied on the
excess assets. Assets may be returned to the employer to bring the funding level down, subject to Inland Revenue requirements and there being
power in the trust deed. If there is no power in the trust deed, the
Occupational Pensions Board can be asked to issue a modification order
to amend the deed. Any refund to the employer is subject to a selfstanding tax charge of 40 percent.
All contributions by the sponsoring employer are tax-deductible, including both regular contributions and contributions to fund a deficiency, provided the plan complies with the rules for tax approval. Although the investment income and capital gains of the investments of
approved pension plans are in principle free of all taxes, some Advanced
Corporation Tax payable by companies cannot be recovered against dividend payments to pension scheme shareholders.
Contributions to personal pension arrangements approved by the Inland Revenue may be made out of gross income by employed individuals
who are not members ofoccupational pension plans and out of profits by
the self-employed. Individuals who are members of an occupational pension plan may make additional contributions to a free-standing additional voluntary contribution (FSAVC) scheme. However, for employees
in an occupational plan the overall limitation on contributions of 15
percent of earnings applies. Rather higher limits are applied where the
provision is solely through a personal pension, ranging from 17'h percent
of earnings at younger ages (35 and under), up to 40 percent of earnings
at age 61 and above.

Investment of Funds
The trustees are responsible for investing the assets of the pension fund.
Some of the largest schemes employ their own investment managers.
Medium to large schemes mostJy use the services of stockbrokers or merchant banks for the management of investments, sometimes apportioning the fund between two or more such managers. Investment managers
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must be authorized under the Financial Services Act of 1986 to carry
on investment business. Insurance companies may also offer investment
management services of this type.
Smaller schemes often hand over the funds to an insurance company
to manage. This can be through the purchase of policies on the lives of
individual scheme members, but is now more usually a straight investment contract. This may be unit-linked, where the results depend directly on the behavior of the underlying assets, or deposit administration,
where the capital that has been invested is guaranteed and a variable
amount of interest is added each year at the discretion of the insurer. The
distinguishing feature of an insured arrangement, as compared to a selfadministered one, is that the underlying assets are owned by the insurance company. The asset of the pension plan is the insurance contract.
However, it is possible (and not uncommon) for plans to be partly insured and partly self-administered.
The investments of self-administered pension funds were estimated at
the end of 1990 to account for some US$ 450 billion, equivalent to 55
percent of the gross domestic product in 1990, and a little in excess of the
total net assets of all United Kingdom insurance companies (including
life insurance, property/casualty insurance, and pensions business) of
US$ 415 billion million at the same date.
Since the major part of the liabilities of most pension funds depends
on future earnings inflation during the period up to retirement and on
future price inflation for pensions in payment, fixed interest assets such
as bonds and mortgages are not in general thought to be suitable investments. The emphasis in recent years has been on investment in real
assets, such as equities, property, and index-linked government securities.1t is not common practice to match price-linked liabilities with indexlinked government securities, except in some plans that no longer have
any active members and are running off their liabilities. Some 70 percent
of the assets of self-administered funds are now invested in equity shares,
with about a quarter of these equity holdings in shares quoted on exchanges outside the United Kingdom, in particular in the United States,
Japan, various countries of the European Community, and some countries of the Pacific rim. About 6 percent is invested in real estate. Table 6
shows the 1992 estimated distribution of assets into major categories.
Self-administered pension funds own just over 30 percent of United Kingdom equities quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
Pension fund trustees are required under trust law to invest the assets
of the fund in the best interests of the members. This is usually regarded
as precluding investmel1t in the employing company, or in related organizations, unless the terms are fully competitive with those available in
the market. Any significant equity investment in the employing company
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is regarded as unsound, since it reduces the security of members' pension rights. Insolvency of the employer would affect not only their jobs
but the value of their accrued pension rights. Regulations have been
introduced to restrict self-investment of this type, for contracted-<>ut defined benefit plans, generally to a maximum of 5 percent of total assets.
Contracted-<>ut money purchase plans are required to invest in a prescribed list of assets (including insurance policies), some within certain
limits, but these requirements are not unduly restrictive and are mainly
for the purpose of ensuring appropriateness of investment and adequate
diversification. Apart from this there are no regulations or laws constraining the investment policy of pension funds or affecting the value that may
be placed on the assets for funding or solvency purposes.
Trustees often use portfolio performance measurement services to
monitor the investment performance achieved by the managers. Some of
these services compare the fund's performance with that of other funds,
so that conclusions can be drawn as to whether the fund's performance
is above the median, in the upper quartile, and so on. Other services
compare performance sector by sector with a suitable index and overall
against a benchmark asset distribution set by the trustees.
Some pension funds are managed on a fully discretionary basis. In
other cases the trustees establish a benchmark distribution, for example
60 percent United Kingdom equities, 20 percent overseas equities, and
20 percent index-linked government securities. The investment manager
is then monitored against the performance of such a portfolio. They can
deviate from the benchmark to achieve improved returns, but will need
to be able to justify to the trustees the more "risky" profile adopted.
Over the ten years 1982 to 1991 the median return of all pension funds
participating in a major performance measurement service was just over
16 percent a year. This may be compared with average price increases of
5.6 percent a year over the same period and earnings increases of 8.2
percent a year.

Replacement Rates
The basic social security pension aims to provide 100 percent replacement of income up to the lower earnings limits. This represents some 18
percent of national average earnings. Since the benefit is flat-rate, the
replacement ratio clearly falls as earnings increase above this level. Replacement ratios may also be less for those with an incomplete contribution record.
The earnings-related additional pension is still not mature. Those
reaching state pension age in 1993-1994 can receive an additional pension ofaround 18 percent ofrevalued career average earnings in the band
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between the lower and upper earnings limits. This proportion rises to 25
percent for those reaching state pension age in 1998, before falling gradually to 20 percent for those reaching state pension age in 2001 and later.

Retirement Income
Table 7 shows the average distribution of retirement income by source at
a recent date for all those over retirement age, together with corresponding information for selected earlier years. This shows the growth of the
role of occupational pension provision, which can be expected to play an
even greater role in the future with increased maturity of occupational
pension arrangements and with improvements in the facilities for transferring pension rights on change of employment and for preserving up
to retirement age accrued pension rights in respect of early leavers.

Public Policy
Government policy for more than a decade has been to restrict the
growth of public provision for retirement and to encourage the growth of
private provision. The basic pension is intended to provide a low level of
guaranteed retirement income for the majority of members of the population, financed according to ability to pay by earnings-related contributions from employees, employers, and the self-employed.
The second tier of retirement income should ideally be provided by
occupational pensions or personal pensions. In recognition of the fact
that the coverage of such arrangements is not universal and is unlikely to
become so in the foreseeable future, an additional earnings-related pension facility is provided by the social security system. This is clearly envisaged as a back-up, or safety net, and every encouragement is provided
to employers and to individuals to replace this additional level of social
security by occupational or personal pension provision.
Social security for retirement is operated on a contributory basis and is
clearly redistributive, with the major part of the benefit expenditure
being flat rate, but contributions earnings-related, albeit with an upper
earnings limit for employees' contributions. The system incorporates
incentives to encourage private provision, particularly by means ofappropriate personal pensions. Tax incentives are given to encourage both
occupational and personal pensions. The main value of these consists of
the deferment of tax, tax-free lump sums, and the possibility of restricting the tax payments to a lower percentage of income since total income
is likely to be lower in r~tirement than at the working ages.
The self-employed are covered by the basic pension and are encouraged to make further provision through tax-efficient personal pensions.
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Private pension plans play an important role, covering about 50 percent of employees as active members and another 20 percent of employees with vested accrued rights to a pension at retirement age. About
60 percent of those over the age of 60 are in receipt of an occupational
pension, but the proportion is higher for those newly attaining retirement age. The average occupational pension in payment is over US$ 90 a
week and for those retiring now it is around US$ 120 a week.
Personal pensions have grown in popularity since they became available as a vehicle for contracting out of the State Earnings Related Pension. The financial incentives in the contracting-out arrangements have
meant that most appropriate personal pensions have been taken out by
people under the age of 40, with older people remaining fully in the state
scheme.
An investigation by the National Audit Office in 1990 estimated that
the gross cost of the contracted-out contribution rebate and incentive for
personal pension optants might be around US$ 14 billion in the six years
from April 1988 to March 1994. The estimated present value of savings in
future costs of earnings-related pensions was US$ 5 billion.
Although public policy is to encourage employers to provide occupational pension plans and employees to have private pension provision, it
is thought right that individuals should have freedom of choice and not
be required to join their employer's plan. Anyone who wishes to can opt
instead for a personal pension, or remain in the state earnings-related
pension scheme.
In the absence of centralized supervision of occupational pension
schemes, disclosure requirements have been developed. These are now
quite elaborate and add significantly to the burden on scheme administrators. It is not known how useful this disclosure is to members in
general, although in principle it should act as a deterrent to bad practice
on the part of employers and scheme administrators. The deterrent effect may be rather weak in the absence of a supervisory body and strong
sanctions.
Legislation following the Report of the Pension Law Review Committee is likely to lead to significant changes in the regulatory framework,
to a pensions supervisory authority, minimum funding standards, and
strengthened roles for scheme administrators, actuaries, auditors and
investment managers
It is unlikely that there will be any change in the basic policy of encouraging complementary pension plan provision or, in the next few years at
least, any attempt to build up the role of state provision. If anything, the
process of privatization of pensions might be expected to go further.
There will be moves to simplify the contracting-out arrangements, as part
of the process of equalizing state pension age for men and women.
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There will be age-related rebates for contracting out by means of
money purchase plans. This should make personal pensions and COMPs
attractive for contracting out at all ages, and thereby lead to a further
growth of complementary provision and a further diminution of the role
of the state in providing retirement income.
Personal pensions at the minimum level for contracting out are unlikely to provide a very adequate income in retirement. A major challenge for education (and marketing) is, therefore, to persuade people
that they must make additional voluntary contributions and that the
responsibility for ensuring an adequate retirement is theirs. The state will
not provide more than the basic flat-rate pension to those who have been
contracted out. Of course, there will still be the possibility of meanstested income support, but the whole thrust of encouraging private provision for pensions is to lessen the dependence on state benefits.
Views differ as to the likely success of these objectives. Trade unions
and staff associations in general remain very suspicious of personal pensions, which they see as putting too much of the risk (particularly of
investment performance relative to inflation) on the individual and too
much money (commission, profit, etc.) into the hands of financial intermediaries, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. The
preferred option of organized labor is the final salary occupational pension plan, if possible with full price indexation of pensions, both in payment and in deferment.
Most large employers remain satisfied with their existing defined benefit occupational pension plan arrangements, although many complain
bitterly about the complexity of the many different requirements and
threaten to discontinue the plan if any more regulations are introduced.
A new employer might, however, be more inclined to set up a money
purchase plan.
There are problems associated with the selling of personal pensions. It
is a difficult choice for individuals to make to leave the state earningsrelated pension scheme for an appropriate personal pension, or to forgo
membership of a final salary occupational pension plan for a personal
pension. The choice is far from straightforward, because the nature of
the benefits is very different. The individual needs to understand that
certain types of guarantees are being given up, relating to the level of
pension and the extent of indexation. In return there is greater personal
control over pension assets and the possibility of good results if the investment policy is successful.
The selling of financial products in the United Kingdom is governed
by the Financial Seryices Act 1986 (FSA), administered by the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), and the various self-regulatory (i.e.,
industry-led rather than government) bodies. The FSA requires the fi-
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nancial intermediary to "know the customer" and to offer "best advice."
There are also requirements regarding documentation of the advice,
projections of future benefits, disclosure of commission, and so on.
Of course, there are many reasons why an individual might take out a
personal pension. The public policy concern is whether many (or some)
such individuals have been badly advised, or even misled, by eager salespersons and have not properly understood the nature of the choice being
made.
Since membership of an occupational pension plan is voluntary, it is
always possible for an individual to opt out, either just for future service
or also by taking a transfer value in respect of past service pension rights
to a personal pension. The determination of the transfer value is in the
hands of the pension scheme actuary, operating under the requirements
of professional Guidance Note 11 (GN!!), as for ordinary plan transfers.
There is some concern that this gives too great a level of discretion to the
actuary and that, as a result, transfer values, although defined as the cash
equivalent of the vested accrued rights forgone, may vary too much from
plan to plan.
These concerns about transfers, opting out, and personal pensions are
of more widespread significance than the higher profile issues of the
shortfalls in the Maxwell pension plans. Pensions in payment have so far
continued to be paid from the plans and the future prognosis is not
looking too bad, since money is being recovered from various sources
and guaranteed minimum pensions for the contracted-out plans are in
any case underwritten by social security.
However, the publicity surrounding the affair has created concern in
the minds of a lot of pension plan members, and many trustees have
taken steps to improve controls in order to reduce any risk there might be
to pension fund assets. Recent legislation may address this problem with
a variety of provisions, including minimum solvency standards, an appointed scheme actuary requirement, member representation on the
trustees, an effective pensions regulatory system, and a limited compensation scheme.

Equal Treatment of Men and Women
In !986 the European Community Directive on equal treattnent of men
and women in occupational social security schemes was approved. Although requiring equality of treatment, there was a temporary exemption for retirement age and for benefits to surviving spouses, pending
equalization of retirement age in social security systems.
Actuarial factors that differed by sex could still be used for individual
calculations, such as converting pension to lump sum, and for defined
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contribution plans. Some of these exemptions have been challenged in
the courts, and a very important landmark judgment was given in the
European Court ofJustice on May 17, 1990 in the case of Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange. The Court took the view in this case that the principle
ofequal pay for men and women, which is enshrined in Article 119 of the
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community, applied also to
equal pensions for men and women (and to other benefits). It followed
that the age at which there was entitlement to a pension had to be the
same for men and women, and should have been so from 1957 onward.
In the judgment on the Barber case the Court sought to limit the retrospective impact on pension plans, but considerable uncertainty remained about the interpretation of these provisions. It was clear, however, that, at the least, pension rights accruing in respect of periods of
pension plan membership after May 17, 1990 should comply fully with
the principle of equal treatment. Very many United Kingdom plans took
action to implement equal pension ages for benefits accruing from that
date, but most sought to avoid making the changes in respect of any past
service.
There was also uncertainty about whether it was permissible under
European Community law to implement equal pension ages by raising
women's retirement age. Was it necessary to level up benefits when implementing equal treatment? Did an increase in retirement age constitute a
worsening?
Further problems arose in the United Kingdom with regard to bridging pensions (higher pensions paid to men between 60 and 65 to compensate for the fact that the state pension age for men is still 65, while
that for women is 60, with the aim of providing an equal pension in total).
There was also a continuing debate over whether some types of actuarial
calculation should be based on unisex tables.
In December 1991 the government issued a consultation paper on
equalization of the state pension age for men and women. Following a
period of consultation the government announced a decision to equalize
at 65 from 2020, with a phasing in of the higher pension age for women
from 2010 to 2020. The system of contracting out of the earnings-related
additional pension is also to be equalized from 1997.

Pension Funds Directive
In 1992 the European Commission proposed a pension fund directive
that was intended to provide freedom of cross-border investment for
pension funds and freedom to choose an investment manager from another European Community country. These proposals were in general
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welcomed in the United Kingdom. However, a measure intended to liberalize the investment scene for pension funds was modified in the negotiations and might have imposed restrictions that do not exist at present for
United Kingdom pension funds.
The original intention of the directive was that relaxing investment
constraints throughout the European Community would allow large
companies with several subsidiaries in different member states to achieve
real savings. These would be available from the potential improvement of
investment yields (due to greater investment choice between countries
and among asset categories) and the reduction of costs arising from
consolidation. There would also be greater competition between asset
managers as the market for new business increased.
The proposed directive has now been dropped, as unresolved disagreements arose on matters such as the extent of control on currency matching of assets and liabilities.

Cross-Border Membership
The original intention of the European Commission (1992) had been to
include in the pension funds directive some provisions to facilitate crossborder membership of pension plans within the European Community.
However, this proved to be too difficult.
Current impediments to the free movement of workers within the
European Community include differing social security regimes, differing
levels of benefits provided in different countries, different tax regulations applicable to employer and employee contributions to complementary plans, unwillingness to permit transfer values to other countries, and
lack of consensus on minimum vesting requirements, ranging from oneyear vesting in the Netherlands to no minimum vesting requirements in
several member states.
Although social security systems differ substantially, both in structure
and in matters such as pension age, some progress was made in 1971
toward reducing obstacles to cross-border movement through a regulation that requires periods of contribution to different social security systems to be aggregated in determining entitlement. Occupational pension plans are not, however, covered by these arrangements.
Probably the biggest obstacle to an effective solution is posed by the
rules and regulations relating to tax approval of pension plans. In order
to prevent abuse of the tax advantages available to occupational pension
plans, transfer payments other than to another approved pension plan in
that country may be restricted.
When a member leaves a United Kingdom occupational pension plan
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after more than two years' membership, he or she has the right to vested
accrued benefits, payable in due course at retirement age. This applies
whether the member is changing employment within the United Kingdom or moving to another country. Possible loss of pension rights cannot, therefore, be considered to be an obstacle to such moves from the
United Kingdom to other countries. When someone changes employment within the United Kingdom, a cash equivalent transfer value to
another approved scheme (or to a personal pension) is available as
an alternative to the deferred vested benefits. There are some restrictions on such transfers being made outside the United Kingdom. Transfers cannot be made to pay-as-you-go social security systems such as the
French "regimes complementaires" or to internal book reserve schemes
such as occur in Germany and to a lesser extent elsewhere. Subject to
certain conditions imposed by the Inland Revenue, transfers may be
made to independent pension funds (including insured plans) in other
member states of the European Community and elsewhere. The relevant
conditions are: (1) the move to the other country must be permanent;
(2) the member must have requested the transfer or given written consent; and (3) the receiving scheme must be a tax-approved bona fide
arrangement. Guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) 'benefits are not
usually transferable, but must be left as an entitlement from the United
Kingdom ceding scheme.
Notwithstanding the possibility of making transfers as above, the relevant receiving fund in another country may not be willing to accept a
transfer of funds with immediate vesting of accrued rights. Transfer payments from pension schemes in other countries can be accepted by a
United Kingdom approved fund with the agreement of the Inland Revenue. The resulting benefit rights to the member, when combined with
subsequent entitlements, would, however, be subject to the usual overall benefit limits. Benefits accrued in an occupational pension plan in
another country (but not transferred by means of a transfer value)
are usually ignored in relation to maximum benefit entitlement in the
United Kingdom. An expatriate worker coming to the United Kingdom
may have the choice of remaining covered by a home country pension
arrangement, joining a United Kingdom plan, or participating in an offshore arrangement.
Because of the two-year vesting requiremem and the availability of
partially inflation-protected vested accrued benefits, occupational pension plans do not present as great an obstacle to cross-border movement
to and from the United Kingdom as in many other countries. There are
still obstacles, however, to remaining a member of a plan in one country
while working, on a relatively temporary basis, in another. An increased
level of mutual recognition of tax-approved pension arrangements would
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be welcome as a means oflessening these obstacles. Discussions continue
within the European Community to see if this problem can be alleviated.

Conclusion
Apart from these direct effects of European Union legislation and Commission initiatives, the development of further economic integration
could have an impact on the investment opportunities for pension funds
in the United Kingdom. There is already an increasing interest in investing in other European Union markets. There does not seem to be any
immediate (or even presently foreseeable) intention of seeking convergence of the form or structure of complementary pension arrangements (or national social security), so we can expect continuation ofthe
current wide variety of arrangements in different countries.
Attention will continue to focus on improving the possibilities for
cross-border membership of pension funds, to permit companies operating in several countries of the European Union to offer a common pension arrangement and to overcome obstacles to mobility of labor, such as
penal vesting of entitlements.
From a purely United Kingdom perspective there is likely to be continuing debate about contracting out, indexation, and personal pensions. A number of important changes are expected as a result of the
recent legislation, but it is unlikely that this will be the end of a continuous process of evolution and change.
Notes

'This chapter draws heavily on Government Actuary (1994a, b).
'For further reading on Social Security in the United Kingdom see Daykin
(1989), Dilnot and Walker (1989), and Government Actuary (1990, 1991, 1992,
1994, b). See also Secretary of State for Social Security (1992, 1993).
'For further reading on private pension in the United Kingdom see Arthur and
Randall (1990), Collins (1992), Davies (1991), Daykin (1990), and Department
of Social Security (1981, 1982, 1989, 1994c), as well as Government Actuary
(1994) and McLeish and Stewart (1993).
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Comments by Anthony M. Santomero

Christopher Daykin has offered the reader a cogent review of the pension
system in the United Kingdom and its evolution during the past couple of
decades. The author should be praised for a picture that permits an
outsider a clear understanding of the structure, financial position, and
public policy issues facing the British pension system.
His review is sufficiently lucid to make any recapitulation redundant.
Accordingly, my comments here will focus on three points that Mr. Daykin discusses but that warrant further attention. These are: (1) the stability of the government system in light of the "opt out" option to the
private system; (2) the overwhelming dependence of the system on the
defined benefits structure; and (3) EEC transferability. In each of these
cases the author's description of the current state makes this reader
somewhat less comfortable with the status quo than the writer. Allow me to
discuss each point in turn.
System Stability
As the author would readily admit, pension programs are types of special-

purpose financial institutions. The health and stability of these plans
depend upon the balancing of income and expenses, in short, maintaining a non-negative present value. Changes in their environment, caused
by shocks in the external economy or public policy perspective, will improve the health of these institutions only if they do not adversely affect
the balance between the present value of both income and expenses.
Over the last decade, however, the changes affecting public sector
pension plans have not all been stabilizing. As Daykin notes, since 1987
individuals could contract out of the state's earnings-related pension
plan in favor of one of the private sector alternatives. Indeed, there is an
overwhelming movement in the United Kingdom away from the staterun system, toward private sector alternatives.
Extreme care must be taken during this transition, as the residual
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system could become vulnerable as individual members "opt out" only
when it is advantageous to do so. We see this opportunistic behavior in
the United Kingdom today. As the author notes, the contract-out rebate
is a flat percentage of earnings and is unrelated to the actuarial liability
associated with it. Accordingly, younger employees find it attractive to
contract out, only to enter the system in older age. Obviously, such behavior is not sustainable unless the benefits are adjusted downward to
offset the lost revenue from wage earners reducing their contributions to
the program in early years. In this case, the system will exploit the uninformed or low-income earners who have not contracted out of the system. Alternatively, if all become informed players, the system becomes a
specialized old-age pension plan viable for elderly workers only.
The resolution to the problem is mentioned by Daykin himself. Contract-out rebates must be made age dependent. Then, the system upon
which a large number of workers depends will not possess this adverse
selection feature. While it is laudable that this feature is being discussed,
it is necessary that such a measure be passed to prevent the movement to
private pensions from becoming a long-term public drain.

The Defined Benefit Structure
As the author notes, the United Kingdom pension system is predominantly a defined benefit structure. The public sector system clearly is a
defined benefit scheme, and the occupational pension plans are mostly
of this type as well, In this respect, the United Kingdom is behind the
trend that has been prevalent elsewhere for some time, namely the move
toward defined contribution plans. It is obvious that unions prefer defined benefit plans and a greater say in pension fund decisions. Equally
obvious is the fact that the employers are increasingly unwilling to absorb
the risk of defined (virtually indexed) benefits. Accordingly, firms have
been pushing toward limits on both contributions and recourse to firm
resources by pension plan trustees.
There is significant evidence of a trend in the United Kingdom toward
defined contribution plans as well, although Daykin understates it. He
notes that there is little evidence of conversions thus far in the United
Kingdom from defined benefits plans to defined contributions plans.
However, he goes on to say that newly established schemes have moved
toward the defined contribution model. This should be expected. While
large firms and/ or large unions are reluctant to demand "give-backs"
if only because of the employee morale issues, new plans will adapt to
the new economic realities that have led others to defined contribution
plans. As the intern.ational economy becomes more competitive, firms
have tried to limit their exposure to long-term, open-ended labor con-
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tracts in favor of short-term ones. Multi-year commitments to employment have long given way to layoffs and cyclical employment contracts. It
should come as no surprise that management will seek the same shortterm focus on pension contributions and commitments.
Of course, labor will object and protest. This is natural as the firm
sector sheds its role as insurer of real income in retirement. However,
global competition will make this trend as inevitable in the United Kingdom as it has been in the United States and as it is becoming in Japan.
But all is not lost. As the author mentions, a shift toward defined
contribution plans increases the employee's involvement in his or her
savings decisions and in the capital markets themselves. There is a silver
lining to every cloud.
EEC Transferability

The European economy is no longer a set of distinct economic markets.
Increasingly, it is an interconnected entity with firms and products crossing borders at will. Labor, of course, has been the slowest commodity to
migrate. Even here, however, over time the labor market of Europe will
become transnational. In this context, the portability of pensions becomes a serious issue. Yet until recently it has been underdeveloped as an
area of harmonization.
Recent policy directives appear to be changing this situation. However,
substantial barriers remain. As the author notes, current impediments in
the pension area include: (I) differing benefits; (2) different social security regimes; (3) differing tax schemes; and (4) differing vesting rules.
While subsequent directives and enabling legislation at the national level
will erode away these differences, the status quo is simply not acceptable.
Tax differences may be the most difficult politically, but they are the least
important. Differential regulation, government guarantees, and public
funding of the social system retard cross-border labor movement. They
adversely affect both workers and the social objectives of government
policy.
If the Second Banking Directorate is any indication, these differences
will be worked out, with some combination of cross-border membership
and reciprocity. Over time, national origin may well define pension
rights, and standardization may well replace the patchwork of systems
currently in place. But differences remain in some other areas of financial harmonization because of the sheer complexity of the issues involved. The problems should not be underestimated.
There is, however, a way out. Most problems of pension rights and
responsibilities flow from public systems and defined benefits programs.
Defined contributions programs more easily lend themselves to financial
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harmonization, with some exceptions. The trend toward private sector
programs and defined contributions programs indicated above, therefore, enhances Europe's ability to offer its workers portability. It does so
without the need to reconcile tax legislation, funding differentials, and
national origin issues that arise from the public defined benefit systems
that are being replaced.
In essence, the forces of change are enhancing workers' rights, while
they are transforming the pension fund system in the United Kingdom,
as well as elsewhere in the EEC. As a major participant in the United
Kingdom system, Daykin will oversee this transformation on behalfof the
British workers he represents. Based upon his grasp of the issues relevant
to the current British system, and his significant contributions to that
system during his stellar career, they are in good hands.

